Gmc28

i did carry-on there quite a bit on that last post :-> A shorter version of an answer is that yes, complacency kills, and I preach at every new hire class and every annual recurrent that “if you’re too nervous when you fly (and preparing to fly) then you’re probably in the wrong job, and if you’re not nervous at all when you fly, then you're definitely in the wrong job”.

complacency is unquestionably our #1 issue, based on industry data, as well as data from within my own company, where during this last big pilot shortage everyone became afraid of allowing such low time pilots into the professional ranks due to necessity. but turns out the strong majority of issues that are captured in our SMS are not from inexperienced pilots, but from highly experienced pilots being complacent. as you note, battling complacency is a real challenge. I don’t have the answers, just lots of little things we all do. that air france thing, ugh. there’s usually more to the story, and I get that, but from where i sit that right seater had no business being there, hauling back on the stick in panic/animal-reflex like he was. Thats actually something i thought our industry was doing a good job, training that out of people…. “i need to go up, so pull up”, which of course is all wrong in a stall. sim training (etc) seems to have generally done a good job training that out of people, but apparently not good enough. And so thats where experience does play into safety…. pilots who have never had to see what they’ll do under true, unanticipated issues, are real wildcards in my mind. Darwin at work… you need to see some real action/issues before you and the rest of the world will know how you’re wired. then after that, yes, proper training. but there are so, so many pilots flying, and with such an astronomically fantastic safety record compared to any other normal transport mode, it sort of falls into the “it’s going to happen now and then” category, though that understandably sounds disrespectful to those who died. the repetition which leads to complacency is co-mingled with great habits that are formed, which are part of “experience”. we achieve the experience to be able to be comfortable and competent, no longer the wound-up, slightly anxious, “low timer”, but with that comes a natural regression into some degree of complacency. There’s no substitute for self discipline. beyond that, i do think that AI will be a true plus here, though it will take forever to benefit us, as it takes soooo long for the FAA and our litigious society to get anything done in commercial aviation. that said, as alluded earlier, the overall safety record is so good there actually shouldn’t be any panic-type approach to any of this. in fact, i don’t have near enough info for a qualified final opinion, but i don’t know in this case what I would change on the side of CRJ crew/industry side. any changes made to address this specific issue would probably have negative effects on other scenarios. its the military side in this case that probably needs to be looked at for possible enhancements, or more simplistically, just re-configuration of the airspace. that airspace is undeniably crazy. we lived without it for years after 9-11, but Reagan national re-opened, which i suppose is good, but regardless of all else that’s what allowed this scenario to play out as it did.

there are lots of places where the thick air traffic is crazy, though there are surprisingly few issues, despite what i would have said was common sense that "this can't end well". We have the majority of our operations in Alaska, where the skill set needed there is one that requires a real change for pilots coming up from lower 48 (for the village flying, not so much the big airport flying), and not all the folks from down south can adapt. on the other hand, when we have an alaskan pilot move south, its fun in many cases to watch those confident, skilled, experienced aviators suddenly have a look of shock when they first depart the LA basin in a jet, with so much traffic and ATC chatter... thats something they have to adapt to. I moved from Anchorage to LA in the 90's, and that first month down there i'll admit I was properly humbled. Then i got to enjoy watching my friends that I hired and moved down from Alaska all go through the same thing...."What, what are you looking at?" they'd say, as we're holding short for their first take off. "oh, you'll see, mr. tough guy...".

you're not wrong. but even if trained that way and fully "buying in", its takes several moments to snap out of your reverie of doing the same old thing and then reacting. its true that we're trained that we must follow the directions of an RA, but that flies in contrast to the "calm down and deal with things with a cool head", as over-reaction has caused a good deal more pain and suffering than a slightly delayed reaction time to an issue, in most scenarios. But not all scenarios. Even for an RA, which they didn't have (only TA, presumably), you'd normally have several seconds to react. I'll say that my reaction to a TA is first to quickly look at the fish-finder (the screen that shows you where your nearby traffic is) to see whats going on. We get TA's semi regularly, and the response is to check the fish finder to see whats up, then look outside for the real target/aircraft, and normally little or nothing needs to be done other than monitoring that other target. I only very rarely get RA's, and a calm reaction to do what is being directed works fine. Down low where a helo is coming up fast from underneath you... I think that'd be a helluva test, requiring astute technique and at least a little luck, and maybe a lot of luck.

agreed. and that's neat that you got the chance to do that VFR corridor flight a number of times. I always felt guilty scooting along that route while slowed down to whatever the max speed that was allowed, in a lovely old, gas-guzzling, loud, 20 series Lear. Felt like somehow I was going to get in trouble. its a reasonable assumption in my mind that in DC the rotor driver just did an "oops", and then things happened pretty quick and ended badly.

ah yes, RA inhibited. don’t think it would make a difference in this case, as a pilot will typically need to mentally process what the barking-betty is saying, which should be quick, but whether its a “traffic, traffic” call or a “climb, climb” RA, there would be a brief pause before the pilot initiated real action, and in this case probably too late. And i’m not sure what the (simple) logic circuit would make of the path of the helo…

No TCAS below 1000’? not sure where that comes from… it should work fine, just with different parameters. Thats some really crowded airspace, so while its all horrible of course what happened, and the odds are astronomically in favor of a safe operation based on the zillions of flight hours and operations that have safely been done, its still not totally surprising that an “oops” from a pilot would cause the carnage in that crowded area. Well before 9-11, which of course changed everything, we’d sometimes depart Teterboro and fly down the hudson in a little jet (lear 20 series) very low… I believe the VFR corridor dictated we be at 1100’ or thereabouts, right in proximity to helicopters and little piston planes, and it felt like you could touch the statue of liberty. Seemed a bit naughty, as the corridor was intended for light aircraft and helo’s, but regardless, in addition to all those little aircraft swarming around us everywhere we were also sandwiched so near the arriving and departing IFR corridors for Newark and Teterboro. But somehow it all worked…. most of the time. the military guys are exceptionally well trained, but not always as adept with civilian ATC, as they may have more distraction and/or a lot less experience in flight hours in that realm. We’ll sometimes see helicopter pilots that finish their military stint and have not much more than 1000 hrs of flight time on their resume. not totally fair to compare the two types of flying, but in the fixed wing civilian world, you’d need more hours than that to even begin to sit as co-pilot.

that's hilarious, and certainly reminiscent of way back when that's the way things were going in the US. when was that class, out of curiosity? clearly its all just what we're used to. i'm all-in on metric, and get annoyed when i have to reach into the "stupid" side of my alternate toolbox to dig out SAE, and gallons/liters conversion is easy because of lots of necessary practice when flying international, (etc.,) but in the same breath can say that for woodworking & construction type things, I just never made the change (because no one else really has), so its all inches and feet still in my brain.

Interesting. And some good things to try on my end. yes, dot 4. Tying off the lever I’ll do, but maybe letting it gravity flow as suggested first for a while would be the thing. Then tie it off. All free and easy things to try. sad thing is that if that works, then I likely replaced a part or two for no good reason. Perhaps the original issue was just air in the system from it sitting outside for so long and maybe a loose fitting somehwhere. C’est la vie. But will see how it goes.

That. From Nate Bargatze playing George Washington on SnL last year: “I dream that one day our proud nation will measure weights in pounds, and that 2,000 pounds shall be called a ‘ton,’” Washington said. When a soldier played by Bowen Yang asked, “And what will 1,000 pounds be called, sir?,” Bargatze deadpanned, “Nothing.” Washington then waxes poetic about various bizarre American measurements, such as “rulers with two sets of numbers: inches on one side, centimeters on the other,” that “won’t line up and never will”. (except of course for 13mm.... 1/2"!)

I like it... thats the question/topic I more commonly am interested in when I'm bleeding systems, to get that last bit of air out. In this case I have no fluid making it through at all, which is bizarre for me, but in reality most of the time when i'm doing something like this what you're talking about is of key interest. at least for a "why not", i'll go lash the lever back for an overnight. I did, at least in my mind, seem to think there was a slightly different feel/sound when i released the bleed valve after holding the lever in for many seconds, and certainly notice over the years that when i get impatient and pump the lever too fast its different than when its slow and with a slight hold before opening the valve, as you'd well know. And for fun Phil, I checked for water on an old C140 a couple decades ago, only to learn the hard way that the sump drain on an unmodified 140 is mid tank, so as a tail dragger, I wasn't sumping anything but the fuel above the water that was hiding down there at the aft/bottom.... Ran great till about 800ft AGL, then I had a nice unplanned landing at my in-laws fallow field.

makes sense. had occured to me that the metal sheathed line could somehow be the core issue, but figured since there's no fluid leaking at all, that the line is ok. but perhaps there is a compromised line which allows air in, but doesnt' necessarily let fluid out.

Old topic, but the nuisance issue i'm having hasn't gone away. Next step is that i'll try another version of a lid for the reservoir, as the one i got cheap online and which seems to fit just fine, gushes brake fluid out through the threads. Made a decent home-made seal/gasket, and same issue. Must be threads on the cap that are "just exactly wrong" to look and feel right, but actually causing it to go on a bit crooked. odd. I'm thinking a larger cap that assures i have a clean, flat interface with top of the reservoir, and a decent seal/gasket, then clamp it in place, and that should work. However, the core issue is more the question for anyone who wants to weigh in, which is related to why the system won't bleed, even the "old fashioned way". I've bled lots of brakes, and always the same technique (squeeze, twist/open, twist/close, release, re-squeese... slowly), with the only question being how much patience was required. But this Cagiva clutch setup came to me from my son with no action... just a smooth, no-resistance pull on the clutch handle. it would barely bleed when i checked it, so i "shotgunned" the decision that it was the master, and replaced it. no change.... it would bleed a little fluid, but barely, after a lot of bleed action. ok, so i popped on another slave i had laying around from another old Duc i had which cross referenced (it worked when it came off), and now after a hundred (?) pulls to bleed it manually, its just a tiny spurt of air at the bleed/lower end each time, never even a hint of fluid. Bled the master first, just to assure it was coming out of the master at the banjo fitting (which introduces air, of course), then a zillion pumps later its the same spurt of air but no fluid movement. Technique flaw? Never had this issue before, having replaced a good number of slaves, but this simple issue has me scratching my head. the solution to push fluid through using the new contraption had been just a nifty way to enhance the process, but now i see it as a way to validate that all the air is gone by pushing fluid through, so thats where i've become focused. I also have an old, old suction version of the brake bleed tool, which I never liked, but may try that just to eliminate some variables.

if you'll distribute some sweet mascot logos to us all!

seems brians noun use and grammar would pass just fine with Count Olaf ("grammar is the greatest joy in life, don't you know...", or maybe it was some other character from that Lemony Snicket movie my daughter used to quote), or any of our jr high grammar teachers, and pressureangle will be the helluva guy in this group to perhaps soon have a proper new gear box :->